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Abstract 
Towns and cities across the United States are considering the municipalization of their 
electric utilities as an alternative to investor-owned or deregulated utilities. This paper 
studies the effect of municipalization on local economies, specifically the changes in the 
unemployment rate in a county that experienced a recent municipalization. A difference-
in-differences model analyzes the possible effects of municipalization on unemployment 
rates between county-pairs given underlying economic trends. The results demonstrate 
that municipalization may reduce a county’s unemployment rate by 6.9% when compared 
to a county that did not experience a recent municipalization. However, there is evidence 
suggesting that those counties that have had a recent municipalization are in some way 
different from those that have not.  
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I. Introduction 
There are two main types of electricity providers: investor owned utilities and 
municipal or public owned utilities. While both originated in the 1880s when electricity 
generation and distribution was first made possible, there has been an increased interest 
in municipalization since the early 1990s. Municipalization of electric utilities generally 
refers to a city or town acquiring distribution and/or generation assets from the electric 
utility that currently serves the municipality, such that the municipality becomes the 
electricity provider for local electricity consumers. This process has taken place in many 
different communities around the United States, and many other communities are 
interested in the policy as an alternative to investor owned utilities and the more recent 
development of deregulation of the entire electric service industry.  
This study estimates the effects of municipalization on the local unemployment 
rate using county-level panel data. Between 1992 and 2007, 17 municipalities in 13 
counties around the United States underwent the process of municipalization. Previous 
research focuses on relative efficiencies between municipal and investor owned utilities 
with mixed findings. This is the first study to empirically estimate a possible economic 
impact of municipalization. 
Results indicate that municipalization is associated with a reduction in the 
unemployment rate of a county when compared to another county that had not 
experienced a municipalization, and that the magnitude of the municipalization affects 
the magnitude of the associated reduction. There is evidence, however, that counties that 
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experienced a municipalization and those that do not differ in some way not captured by 
the model. 
 
II. Background & Literature 
 This section provides a brief history and explanation of investor owned and 
municipal utilities, as well as a context for the current study with regards to previous 
literature. 
 
A. Investor Owned Utilities 
 In the early years of electric service, many small companies competed for 
customers. The emergence of generation technologies, coupled with advances in 
transmission techniques made large-scale production of electricity feasible and cost-
effective.  Smaller firms began to merge, pooling capital to build bigger production plants 
that could support many more customers. These big producers and providers are known 
as private, investor owned utilities (IOUs). States began regulating the IOUs allowing 
regional monopolies, due to the apparent benefits of scale economies. These regulations 
also designate specified rates of return on investment for IOUs. This encouraged 
increased generation to meet the fast-growing demand of the 20th century (Flavin & 
Lenssen, 1994, Sharabaroff, et al, 2009). 
 Until recently, all IOUs have operated as regulated monopolies, controlling 
generation, transmission, and distribution in their regions. U.S. lawmakers, hoping to 
facilitate competition in the industry, passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
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(PURPA) in 1978, and the Energy Policy Act (EP Act) in 1992. PURPA allows companies 
to produce electricity and sell it in a wholesale market to distributors, while the EP Act 
gives wholesale buyers the right to pick their suppliers and receive electricity over existing 
transmission lines, regardless of ownership (Flavin & Lenssen, 1994, Sharabaroff, et al, 
2009).   
In addition to PURPA and EP Act, new technologies increase the economic 
feasibility of small-scale generation. Because of these developments, monopolistic utilities 
may not be the best way to provide electricity (Flavin & Lenssen, 1994). In the early 
1990s, some states began to push for the restructuring and decentralization of the 
industry to increase competition, while some towns and cities began pursuing 
municipalization of electric services to provide better service and lower rates to residents 
and businesses in their communities. 
 
B. Public Ownership of Electric Utilities & Municipalization 
In the early 1900s, some smaller cities and towns lacking the investors to attract a 
larger regional company decided to form publicly owned, municipal electric utilities. The 
number of municipal electric utilities peaked around 3000 in the 1920s when scale 
economies began to shape the industry and larger firms prevailed. Although many 
municipal electric utilities generate and distribute electricity, it is more normal for 
municipalities to buy power from other producers and focus on the distribution to local 
residents and businesses (Kwoka, 2005). 
 These utilities are much different than IOUs. Since the municipality owns its 
utility, a mayor, city manager, or the city council may act as decision-makers for business 
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operations (Peters, 1993). Some municipalities use the municipal electric utility’s revenue 
to fund public projects like schools and libraries, but most are non-profits (Peters, 1993). 
Presently, there are around 2000 electric utilities under municipal ownership, accounting 
for about 15% of total sales to ultimate customers (Schweitzer, 1995, Kwoka, 2008). Large 
U.S. cities with municipal electric utilities include: Los Angeles, Seattle, Detroit, San 
Antonio, and Cleveland (Kwoka, 2005).   
 Recently, there has been an increasing interest in municipalization as an 
alternative to IOUs and restructuring to establish a competitive market. The foremost 
motivation for municipalization is the prospect of lower electricity rates (Kelly, 1997). 
The EP Act allows municipalities to act as wholesale buyers of electricity and distributors 
to residents and businesses in their communities. With access to cheaper electricity and 
their non-profit nature, municipalized electric utilities can pass savings on to customers 
in the form of lower rates. Industrial interests often have a large role in encouraging 
municipalization because they see it as an opportunity to lower their energy bills (Kelly, 
1997). Although there are other motivators behind municipalization, such as a 
community wanting more of its electricity to come from renewable energy sources 
(Energy Future, 2013), lower electricity rates is the most prominent.  
 Regulation developments since the 1970s, and increasing interest in transitioning 
away from state-regulated IOUs has sparked debate over which form of electric utility 
ownership ought to be preferred. Literature associated with this debate is mostly 
concerned with the relative efficiency of public versus private ownership. 
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C. Public vs. Private Ownership: Efficiency 
 The literature discussing relative efficiency of public and private ownership has 
mixed findings, and many papers employ only theoretical models and discussions to 
address the issue. Peters (1993) suggests certain practices of managers of public firms are 
likely to lead to higher production costs overall, resulting in lower production efficiency 
when compared to private firms. Neuberg (1977) disputes this claim, relating that public 
firms attract higher quality management because there is thought to be greater job 
security. As for electric utilities specifically, municipalized utilities may build their own 
generation instead of buying electricity from the IOUs even if doing so is cost-inefficient 
(Wallace & Junk, 1970). 
 Relatively few papers use data to discuss efficiencies. Kumbhakar and 
Hjalmarsson (1998) use a hedonic output model based on a utility’s physical outputs and 
the quality and characteristics of such outputs to judge relative efficiency. The authors 
find increasing returns to scale of distribution, and conclude that private firms are 
relatively more efficient by using less labor while achieving the same output as a public 
firm. Neuberg (1977) analyzes relative cost efficiencies of distribution, yielding very 
different results. He concludes that IOUs may be less efficient in the distribution of 
electricity than public utilities because rate of return regulation guarantees a profit, which 
may discourage cost-minimization.  
In an article regarding the increased interest in municipalization in the 1990s, 
Kelly (1997) offers a foundation for the connection between efficiency and electricity 
rates. Many IOUs are currently constrained by high-cost contracts with independent 
generation facilities, as the cost to produce energy when these contracts were made was 
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higher than current prices for alternative generation. The increased competition in 
wholesale electricity generation due to the EP Act has resulted in increased cost-efficiency 
of power generation accessible to municipal electric utilities, but not IOUs that have 
contracts. In this way, municipal electric utilities may be more cost-efficient than IOUs, 
and can therefore charge lower electricity rates. This connection carries implications for 
the municipalization debate itself, but lower costs to consumers, especially businesses, 
could potentially translate into changes in local employment.  
 
D. Municipalization & Employment 
 Some literature discusses the possible differences in employment between 
municipal and private utilities based on theory. Niederjohn (2003) suggests the decrease 
in employment in the electric utility industry since 1998 may be due regulatory reform 
allowing IOUs to merge, resulting in scale economies that reduce overall employment in 
the now merged firms. As for employment in municipal utilities, overstaffing may result 
from certain managerial practices (Peters, 1993, De Alessi, 1974), the public firm’s social 
obligations to the community (Kwoka, 2005, Nombela, 2001), and uncertainties 
regarding the extent of duties and services the firm is required to perform (Nombela, 
2001). Yet, these changes in utility employment would be relatively small when 
considering the economy of an entire city or county.    
 Kahn and Mansur’s (2013) empirical study of manufacturing industry 
employment across counties explores the relation between electricity prices and the 
geographic clustering of employment. The authors separate manufacturing into 21 
sectors and create a standardized index based on the energy intensity of each. To analyze 
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possible differences in employment due to differences in energy prices, the authors 
compare pairs of counties in which the counties share a border, a method that controls 
for variables like spatial amenities and local labor market conditions. Thirteen of the 21 
sectors studied (those with an energy-intensity index of greater than 0.094) are found to 
have greater employment in counties with lower electricity rates than neighboring 
counties with higher electricity rates. The most energy-intensive industry they study, 
primary metals manufacturing, is found to have an implied price elasticity of 
employment of -1.65. The authors conclude that as the theory of comparative advantage 
suggests, energy-intensive firms tend to locate in areas with lower electricity prices to 
reduce production costs, all else equal. If municipal utilities offer lower rates as compared 
to an IOU, employment in and around places served by a municipal utility may be higher. 
 Municipal utilities generally have lower administrative costs, do not have to pay 
federal income tax, can use tax-exempt municipal bonds, and have access to low-cost, 
federal power, all decreasing the costs of providing electricity, which often translates to 
lower rates for consumers (Schweitzer, 1995). A comparison of electricity rates between 
IOUs and public power providers shows customers of IOUs paying 7% more on average 
than customers of public utilities (American Public Power Association, 2012). Keeping 
this mechanism in mind, the current study compares counties that have experienced a 
recent municipalization to those that have not in order to distinguish relative changes in 
the unemployment rate that may be a result of the municipalization.   
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Figure 1 - Locations of Counties Included in Sample 
 
Table 1 - Counties Included in Sample 
       
      Year of 
Municipalization Treatment Counties (population*) Control Counties (population) 
1997 Pinal,  AZ (187,452) Yavapai,  AZ (164,453) 
2001 Riverside, CA (1,601,183) Orange, CA (2,779,098) 
2003 San Bernardino, CA (1,731,058) Santa Clara, CA (1,640,430) 
1995 New London, CT (261,469) Litchfield, CT (182,954) 
2005 Orange, FL (899,715) Hillsborough, FL (1,007,983) 
2005 Madison, KY (70,435) Bullitt, KY (61,002) 
1998 Nassau, NY (1,323,981) Westchester, NY (916,652) 
2000 Franklin, OH (1,064,037) Hamilton, OH (842,825) 
2002 Umatilla, OR (69,245) Polk, OR (62,113) 
1999 Allegheny, PA (1,283,765) Philadelphia, PA (1,523,242) 
1995 Asotin, WA (20,291) Klickitat, WA (18,689) 
Map source: U.S. Census Bureau 
*(Population values represent a county’s mean population from 1992-2007) 
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III. Data & Methods 
Between the years of 1992 and 2007, 17 municipalities in 14 counties around the 
United States underwent municipalization of electric services in their areas. Of these, 
necessary data for this analysis is available for 11 municipalities in 11 counties (see Figure 
1, Table 1). The outcome variable throughout this analysis is a county’s annual 
unemployment rate, obtained through the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) database. LAUS only has unemployment measures for 
1990 to present, as prior to 1990 county-level unemployment rates were calculated much 
differently and are altogether incomparable according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
The main explanatory variable is an indicator of whether a county experienced a 
municipalization in a recent year, and thus is zero until the municipalization occurs, 
when it changes to 1 for that year and all years following. The dates of municipalization 
are provided courtesy of the American Public Power Association (APPA), but need to be 
compared with U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data found in Form 861 to 
discern the exact year a municipal utility started serving the community, not when the 
community decided to municipalize. 
Other explanatory variables included in the analysis are obtained from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (population only) and U.S. Census Bureau (all others). These are a 
county’s population, percent of the population that is white, percent of the population 
with a Bachelor’s degree or higher, and percent of the population voting Democrat in 
Presidential elections. Because the education and political tendency variables are not 
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available for every year, OLS regressions for each county and variable are used to 
interpolate between years. 
Table 2 - Summary Statistics for Relevant Variables 
     
  Treatment Counties 
  All years Pre-Municipalization Post-Municipalization 
Unemployment rate 5.29 5.65 4.94 
Population 773,876 806,987 741,508 
Percent White 86.6 86.9 86.4 
Percent Bachelor's degree 
or higher 
22.3 20.9 23.6 
Percent voting Democrat 46.3 44.9 47.7 
     
  Control Counties 
  All years Pre-Municipalization Post-Municipalization 
Unemployment rate 5.32 5.21 5.44 
Population 836,312 921,358 753,179 
Percent White 83.5 83.9 83.1 
Percent Bachelor's degree 
or higher 
25.4 24.0 26.8 
Percent voting Democrat 47.8 46.1 49.5 
     
Sample size 352 174 178 
 
A. Primary Specification 
A difference-in-differences model is used to test the hypothesis that 
municipalization changes the unemployment rate of the county in which the 
municipalization occurs. Building from Kahn and Mansur, this analysis uses county-pairs 
to control for any underlying unemployment trends that the counties experience 
regardless of municipalization. 
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Each of the eleven counties is paired with a control county within the same state 
that is closest in size of population to the county experiencing the municipalization (see 
Table 1). The goal in selecting the control counties is to include counties that are similar 
to those that experienced a municipalization. Using population as a basis helps achieve 
this goal, as well as selecting a county within the same state. Data for 22 counties over 16 
years results in a total of 352 observations.  Summary statistics for all of the variables 
discussed above are reported in Table 2. 
The primary specification in this analysis is as follows: 
(1) Yciy = α + βMciy + Xciyϕ + γy + δi + εciy 
Yciy represents the log of the unemployment rate for county c in county-pair i and year y. 
The unemployment rate is logged to capture any non-linearities in the model, and to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results, as a percentage change as opposed to a 
percentage point change can be more easily demonstrated when discussing counties with 
different unemployment rates. Year and county-pair fixed effects are γy and δi, 
respectively, and Xciy contains the set of controls discussed above. The main explanatory 
variable, Mciy, indicates whether a county in a particular county-pair experienced a 
municipalization in a recent year. β is the coefficient of interest and is to be interpreted as 
the presence of a recent municipalization is associated on average with a (100)β% change 
in the unemployment rate as compared to the unemployment rate of the other county in 
the county-pair. ε is the error term. The X vector includes the other explanatory variables 
discussed above. To control for any fixed, unobservable variables that may affect the 
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unemployment rate or municipalization in a county-pair or year, county-pair and year 
fixed effects are included in the model. 
 Using this model, two regressions are run. The first includes the control counties 
as discussed above.  The second regression only includes those eleven counties that 
experienced a municipalization between 1992 and 2007, decreasing the total number of 
observations to 176. By limiting the sample in such a way, this second regression is only 
comparing the counties that experienced a municipalization, and will relate whether or 
not these counties are somehow inherently different from the control counties in the 
original sample. Cutting the sample size in half, though, will likely raise the variance of 
the estimated coefficients, reducing the probability of obtaining statistically significant 
results. 
 
B. Secondary Specification 
A secondary specification employs a panel regression model to estimate the effects 
of the magnitude of a recent municipalization in a county. In this model, the 
municipalization indicator variable is replaced with a measure of percent municipalized 
for county c in year y. The percent municipalized is the number of residents in a county 
served by a municipal utility divided by that county’s population. Again, the 
unemployment rate is logged, so that the estimated β is interpreted as a 1 percentage 
point increase in municipalization is associated on average with a (100)β% change in the 
unemployment rate. 
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Table 3 - Summary Statistics for Percent Municipalized 
  
 All Years 
Pre-
Municipalization 
Post-
Municipalization 
All Counties 7.5 3.2 11.5 
 (16.2)* (6.7) (20.8) 
    
Treatment Counties 9 3.2 14.3 
 (18.3) (4.2) (23.9) 
    
Control Counties 6 3.1 8.7 
 (13.8) (8.5) (16.9) 
    
Sample Size 288 138 150 
 
Residents served by each municipal utility are reported in the EIA Form 861, a 
yearly snapshot of all electric utilities in the United States that is available from 1990 to 
present. Using residents served by a municipal utility instead of commercial businesses or 
industrial customers allows the analysis to demonstrate population-weighted effects of 
municipalization. Two counties that experienced a recent municipalization, Pinal, AZ, 
and Orange, FL had to be dropped from the sample, along with the associated control 
counties. Pinal County’s percent municipalized was calculated to be greater than 400%, 
probably due to the fact that electricity customers data from the EIA is reported for each 
utility, not each county, and a municipal utility may serve customers outside of the 
county in which it operates. Orange County, FL is dropped because of insufficient EIA 
customer data. 
For each county in the sample, including the control counties, the percent 
municipalized changes on a yearly basis. Summary statistics for this variable are reported 
*(Standard deviations are reported below each mean) 
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in Table 3. Additionally, most of the counties in the sample had a municipalization prior 
to 1992, such that percent municipalized is greater than zero for most observations. To 
compare changes in the unemployment rate across all counties in the sample, county-pair 
fixed effects are replaced with county fixed effects. As with the primary specification, two 
regressions are run with this secondary specification. The first includes all counties in the 
sample besides the four counties that are dropped, resulting in 288 total observations. The 
second only includes the counties that experienced a municipalization between 1992 and 
2007 for the same reason as doing so in the primary model and with the same drawback 
of lower sample size, now 144 total observations. 
 
IV. Results 	   The results of this study are reported in Table 4. Column (1) contains the 
estimations of the difference-in-differences model. These results indicate that all else 
equal, counties experiencing a municipalization are predicted to see on average a 6.9% 
reduction in the unemployment rate (significant at the 5% level) when compared to their 
paired county that did not experience a recent municipalization. If two otherwise similar 
counties have unemployment rates of 5%, a municipalization in one county is predicted 
to reduce the county’s unemployment rate to 4.66%, assuming the other county’s 
unemployment rate remains the same.  
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Table 4 - Determinants of County Unemployment Rates1,2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Recent 
Municipalization -0.069 -0.002   
  (0.031)** (0.037)   
      
Percent Municipalized   -0.0035 -0.0021 
    (0.0008)*** (0.0009)** 
      
Population (millions) -0.392 -0.935 -0.888 -0.856 
  (0.044)*** (0.148)*** (0.116)*** (0.163)*** 
      
Percent White -0.019  0.004 -0.034  0.010 
  (0.003)*** (0.009) (0.009)*** (0.013) 
      
-0.016 -0.023  0.017  0.010 Percent Bachelor's 
degree or higher (0.002)*** (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) 
      
Percent voting 
Democrat -0.014 -0.003 -0.027 -0.009 
    (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.005)*** (0.008) 
1Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
2  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively 
 Column (2) relates the results of the panel regression of the eleven treatment 
counties using an indicator variable for when a county experienced a municipalization. 
These results indicate that a municipalization is associated on average with a 0.2% 
reduction in the unemployment rate, although this reduction is statistically insignificant.  
As discussed in the previous section only comparing treatment counties cuts the sample 
size in half, which should result in higher standard errors on the estimated coefficients 
and thus more insignificant estimates. This is supported by the increase in standard 
errors for each estimated coefficient and the associated insignificance of every estimate 
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besides that for population. The large decrease in magnitude of the coefficient on the 
indicator of a recent municipalization suggests the counties that experienced a recent 
municipalization may be different from the counties used as controls in the difference-in-
differences approach.  
To further understand the relation between municipalization and unemployment, 
the indicator of the municipalization variable is replaced with percent municipalized, a 
measure of county population served by a municipal utility. Columns (3) and (4) present 
estimates for this secondary specification. Because many of the control counties have 
residents served by a municipal utility, state fixed-effects are replaced with county-fixed 
effects to allow a comparison across all counties.  
Column (3) reports the results of the secondary model when including the nine 
control counties. All else equal, a county that experiences a 1 percentage point increase in 
percent municipalized is predicted on average to see a 0.35% reduction in its 
unemployment rate when compared to another county that did not experience a change 
in its percent municipalized. This result is significant at the 1% level.  Column (4) gives 
the results of the secondary model using only the eleven treatment counties. The 
coefficient on percent municipalized is again negative, but smaller in magnitude at 0.21% 
(significant at the 5% level). The decrease in magnitude, as seen before in comparing 
columns (1) and (2), demonstrates that counties that have experienced a municipalization 
since 1992 may be different than the control counties in a way not captured by the model.  
Table 3 indicates the average change in percent municipalized for treatment 
counties from before to after municipalization is about 11%. Table 2 indicates the average 
unemployment rate for treatment counties before municipalization is 5.65. Using the 
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results from column (4), an 11% increase in percent municipalized is associated on 
average with a 2.31% reduction in the unemployment rate. Therefore, the increase in the 
percent municipalized is associated with a 0.13 reduction in the unemployment rate, 
resulting in an unemployment rate after municipalization of 5.53. The average post-
municipalization unemployment rate for treatment counties in this sample is 4.94, 
indicating the increase in percent municipalized is associated on average with about 18% 
of the reduction in unemployment seen post-municipalization.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 This study is the first to empirically estimate the possible effects of 
municipalization on a county’s unemployment rate. Growing interest in municipalization 
of electric utilities as an alternative to investor owned utilities and deregulation makes 
discerning the effects of such a policy choice on the larger economic climate interesting 
and important in decision-making at the local, state, and national levels. The reduced 
form econometric unemployment model estimated in this analysis demonstrates that if a 
county experiences a municipalization, it is predicted on average to see a 6.9% decrease in 
its unemployment rate when compared to a county of similar population within the same 
state. However, the counties included in this analysis that experienced a municipalization 
seem to be different than the included control counties in some way not captured by the 
model. The predicted reduction in the unemployment rate shrinks to 0.21% when only 
comparing counties that experienced a municipalization since 1992.  
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To put this effect in terms of a population-weighted magnitude, an additional 1 
percentage point increase in the number of county residents served by a municipal 
electric utility is predicted on average to reduce the unemployment rate by 0.2% when 
compared with other counties that have experienced a municipalization in since 1992. 
This is reduction is associated with about 18% of the decrease in a county’s 
unemployment rate after experiencing a municipalization.  
Further research is required to analyze the mechanisms by which this reduction in 
county unemployment rates may occur. Is it attributable to municipalized electric utilities 
offering lower rates, attracting employment from energy-intensive firms looking for a 
comparative advantage? Other research may study whether the estimated effects of 
municipalization on a county’s unemployment rate seen in this study are a result of 
reverse-causality, or if there is a lead effect of a local unemployment rate on the decision 
of a city or town to municipalize. Finally, as the results presented here reflect, are counties 
that experience a municipalization somehow fundamentally different from counties that 
do not?  
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